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Essay 
Reclaiming the Navajo Range: Resolving the Conflict 
Between Grazing Rights and Development  
EZRA ROSSER 
Grazing is fundamental to Navajo identity, yet management of the Navajo range 
remains highly problematic. This Essay connects the federal government’s 
devastating livestock reduction effort of the 1930s with the inability of the Navajo 
Nation to place meaningful limits on grazing and the power of grazing permittees. 
It argues that the Navajo Nation should consider reasserting the tribe’s traditional 
understanding that property rights depend on use as a way to create space for 
reservation development. 
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Reclaiming the Navajo Range: Resolving the Conflict 
Between Grazing Rights and Development 
EZRA ROSSER * 
INTRODUCTION 
The family grazing permit is the most important asset of many Navajo 
families. When grazing permittees fail to provide adequately for who should 
inherit their permit, grazing right contests can lead to deep family 
resentments and the need for court involvement. Livestock, in particular 
sheep and goats, are a fundamental part of the lifestyle and identity of many 
Diné (the Navajo word for themselves, which can be translated as “the 
people”). The Diné now control the largest reservation in the United States,1 
an area larger than the Republic of Ireland, and the Navajo Nation 
government has significant powers over reservation life. That the tribe has 
this land base and survived as a people despite considerable pressure from 
outside groups—including other tribes, the Spanish, ranchers, and the U.S. 
military2—is testament to the Diné character. The Diné have a long history 
of incorporating outside practices into their culture. This adaptivity helps 
explain why sheep, and grazing generally, are such a fundamental part of 
Diné identity.3  
This Essay argues that the Navajo Nation should more aggressively 
                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. The author is Bilagáana and 
grew up in part on the Navajo Nation. He can be reached at erosser@wcl.american.edu. Thanks to Bidtah 
Becker and Oliver Jury for feedback on an earlier version of this article; to Bethany Berger and the 
Connecticut Law Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium; to the student editors for their 
professionalism and attention to detail; and to Josey Foo, who I may not always agree with but who 
constantly inspires me with her tireless land reform advocacy and work. 
1 Navajo Nation, RDI NATIVE PEOPLES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OFF., U. OF ARIZ., 
http://nptao.arizona.edu/navajo-nation (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) (“The . . . Dine’ . . .  govern the largest 
reservation in the United States, covering more than 27,000 square miles and extending from Arizona 
into Utah and New Mexico. According to the 2015 American Community Survey, more than 300,000 
Navajo reside in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.”). 
2 See Navajo Nation: From Prehistory to the Twentieth Century, NEWMEXICOHISTORY.ORG, 
http://newmexicohistory.org/places/navajo-nation-from-prehistory-to-the-twentieth-century (last visited 
Feb. 1. 2019) (detailing the struggles of the Diné with various groups in order to maintain their presence 
in New Mexico). 
3 See PETER IVERSON, DINÉ: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJOS 21 (2002) (“[I]t was becoming a society 
noteworthy for its members’ willingness to look around the corner and over the next hill, for their 
curiosity about what might be gained by exploration and inquiry, and for their determination to do well.  
. . . Once the people acquired a few horses, they wanted or needed more horses—and more land for them. 
Once they obtained a few sheep, they understood the benefits of having more—and the necessity of 
finding a place for them.”).  
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assert meaningful control over grazing rights and customary use rights.4 In 
some circumstances, the tribe may need to limit some of the rights held by 
tribal members. This is a contentious argument in part because previous 
efforts to reduce the land and grazing rights held by tribal members inflicted 
considerable suffering on the Diné.5 To this day, the Navajo Nation struggles 
with the legacy of livestock reduction, a federally imposed program that 
decimated Diné wealth during the New Deal.6 Though the federal 
government stepped away from active management of the Navajo range 
after World War II, the trauma of livestock reduction continues to paralyze 
land reform efforts. What began as a familiar story of external domination 
became a problem of tribal governance as well. This Essay connects the pain 
of livestock reduction with the myriad ways that grazing and customary use 
rights block economic development on the reservation.  
Resolution of the conflict between grazing rights and development 
ultimately belongs to the Diné people. This Essay avoids answering whether 
land reform should prioritize and reflect local governance experiments at the 
chapter level or whether such reform should be carried out at the national 
level through the central Navajo Nation government in Window Rock. There 
are costs and benefits associated with either of these options, but what is 
important is that the Diné find a way to break the impasse that has existed 
regarding customary use and grazing rights. Livestock reduction was a cruel 
policy that would never have been imposed on white ranchers, but the 
memory of that period should not continue to cripple land reform efforts. It 
is an almost impossible task to locate precisely the moment when, for most 
practical purposes, the Navajo Nation gained effective control over the use 
of tribal land. Was it when the federal government backed away from 
livestock reduction, when President Nixon officially launched the self-
                                                                                                                     
4 This Essay focuses on an issue involving a single tribe and is inspired in part by the late Philip 
Frickey. Shortly before he died, Frickey applauded what he saw as the “emerging movement toward a 
greater legal realism in federal Indian law—a movement away from doctrinal work and toward more 
empirical, more grounded, more experiential examinations of tribal law and tribal institutions.” Philip P. 
Frickey, Address at University of Kansas Conference on Tribal Law and Institutions, February 2, 2008 
- Tribal Law, Tribal Context, and the Federal Courts, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 24, 28 (2008). Navajo 
grazing, unlike, for example, tribal sovereign immunity or tribal labor protections, likely will not be a 
hot button issue before the U.S. Supreme Court anytime soon, but it does play a significant role in shaping 
reservation life and Navajo economic development. 
5 See, e.g., IVERSON, supra note 3, at 137 (discussing how the livestock reduction program 
indefinitely changed the Diné way of life by “caus[ing] massive trauma within the Navajo world” and 
“influenc[ing] attitudes toward . . . land use, . . . tribal government, education, health care, and religious 
observance” (alteration in original)); MARSHA WEISIGER, DREAMING OF SHEEP IN NAVAJO COUNTRY 
209–10 (2009) (discussing how officers arrested, beat, and imprisoned stock-owners who defied drastic 
livestock reducing programs). 
6 See generally RUTH ROESSEL & BRODERICK H. JOHNSON, NAVAJO LIVESTOCK REDUCTION: A 
NATIONAL DISGRACE (2004) (describing the events of livestock reduction in the 1930s and 1940s). 
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determination era in a Special Message to Congress,7 or much more recently 
with the passage of the Hearth Act of 2012?8 Reasonable minds can differ—
for the Navajo Nation, the relative authority of the federal government and 
the tribe arguably switched during the Peter MacDonald era9—but what is 
clear is that today the tribe cannot deflect blame onto the federal government 
for current regulatory failures or mismanagement of customary use and 
grazing rights. Land management problems “belong” to the tribe, and the 
tribe has the authority to implement a better approach.  
This Essay argues that the Navajo Nation should reclaim customary use 
and grazing rights through policies that draw upon the tribe’s traditional 
emphasis on “use” as the basis of property rights. Reclaiming “use” would 
allow the tribe to right-size land holdings where customary use and grazing 
claims not supported by actual use of the land are harming the interests of 
the tribe. Part I describes the significance of livestock in Diné society, gives 
a condensed history of livestock reduction, and highlights the cultural legacy 
of stock reduction. Part II explores the hold grazing rights have over 
reservation development and sketches out some efforts that might be made 
to assert authority over rangeland and free up space for non-agricultural 
development. Part III lays out a theoretical vision for right-sizing grazing 
rights grounded on traditional “use” rights, relying upon traditional values 
to reaffirm existing property rights while requiring that those whose property 
claims have lapsed recognize the claims of the larger Diné community. The 
relatively modest hope of this Essay is to present a set of feasible paths 
forward that will allow the Navajo Nation to gain control of reservation land 
use without trampling on tribal members’ use rights.10   
I. NAVAJO PASTORAL IDENTITY AND LIVESTOCK REDUCTION 
Livestock feature prominently both in Diné identity and in the history of 
the Navajo Nation. Extended family dynamics and gatherings often revolve 
around livestock in some way. Horses, goats, and sheep especially occupy a 
central place culturally, as can be observed in everything from the 
reservation rodeo circuit to the beautiful handmade woolen rugs that many 
                                                                                                                     
7 Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1 PUB. PAPERS 564, 564–65 (July 8, 1970) 
(“The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which 
the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.”). 
8 Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-151, §§ 1–3, 126 Stat. 1150, 1150–54 (2012). 
9 Donald L. Fixico, American Indian Leadership in History to the Present, 29 RIKKYO AM. STUD. 
29, 29 (2007) (“In modern times of the twentieth century, Peter MacDonald of the Navajo guided tribes 
throughout Indian County into the era of Self-Determination . . . .”). 
10 See also Jessica A. Shoemaker, Transforming Property: Reclaiming Indigenous Land Tenures, 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 58–74) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273126) [hereinafter Shoemaker, Transforming 
Property] (arguing that tribes should foster flexibility and innovation in land governance, drawing in part 
on tribal traditions).  
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Diné produce. On the reservation, drivers know to look out for sheep moving 
under the watchful eyes of shepherds and sheep dogs. For many Diné 
families, a grazing permit is their most prized, most defining, and most 
contentious possession. The modern Navajo Nation government was formed 
in 1922 to facilitate oil leases between the Diné and outside corporations,11 
but livestock reduction was the major crisis faced by the nascent Navajo 
Council.12 Livestock reduction left an indelible mark on the Diné people, 
and the Navajo Nation has struggled ever since with grazing rights because 
of the long shadow of that trauma.13  
The very survival of the Diné as a people is a testament to the ability of 
tribal members to build lives around their animals even in the face of 
significant challenges. Selective incorporation of technology and other 
groups into their society14 is a standard Diné practice. Although introduced 
by the Spanish, horses and sheep quickly became part of Diné life.15 
Hostilities occasionally flared between settlers and ranchers to the East and 
Diné living beyond white settlement. Until recently, most histories focused 
on Diné raiding and theft of livestock; but, as more is written about the extent 
to which Indian slavery was a routine part of life in New Mexico, a full 
accounting acknowledges raiding on both sides of the relationship.16 The 
                                                                                                                     
11 History, NAVAJO-NSN.GOV, http://www.navajo-nsn.gov/history.htm# (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) 
(“The discovery of oil on Navajoland in the early 1920’s promoted the need for a more systematic form 
of government. In 1923, a tribal government was established to help meet the increasing desires of 
American oil companies to lease Navajoland for exploration. Navajo government has evolved into the 
largest and most sophisticated form of American Indian government. The Navajo Nation Council 
Chambers hosts 88 council delegates representing 110 Navajo Nation chapters.”). 
12 See ROESSEL & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 45–49 (describing the “terrible sight” that was 
livestock reduction). 
13  See generally id. (describing the impact of livestock reduction from a variety of different 
perspectives). 
14 For example, though there were four original Diné clans, the Diné made other groups, such as 
the Mexican and the Ute clans, part of the tribe. SEYMOUR H. KOENIG & HARRIET KOENIG, 
ACCULTURATION IN THE NAVAJO EDEN: NEW MEXICO, 1550–1750 219 (2005) (“To this day, the 
Navajo—long settled beyond the Dinétah [the traditional Diné homeland]—have many clans of non-
Navajo origin, including Ute, Apache, several Puebloans, and Mexican.”). 
15 See ROBERT S. MCPHERSON, SACRED LAND SACRED VIEW: NAVAJO PERCEPTIONS OF THE FOUR 
CORNERS REGION 61 (1992) (“Interestingly, perhaps the most influential animal to affect the life of the 
Diné was not native to the American Southwest but was introduced by the Spanish. Soon after their 
arrival, sheep became a major economic, social, and religious consideration in traditional Navajo life. 
People measured their status in society, the welfare of their family, and the blessings from the holy beings 
by taking stock of their herds.”); MAUREEN TRUDELLE SCHWARZ, NAVAJO LIFEWAYS: CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES, ANCIENT KNOWLEDGE 7 (2001) (“After livestock were first introduced into the region by 
Spanish settlers, a herding economy based on sheep and goats developed. The Navajo population and 
their area of settlement gradually expanded as new crops, animals, and technological innovations 
continued to be added to their subsistence base during the Spanish and American periods.”). 
16 For lengthy treatment of the Indian slave trade, see generally ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, THE OTHER 
SLAVERY: THE UNCOVERED STORY OF INDIAN ENSLAVEMENT IN AMERICA (2016). See also WEISIGER, 
supra note 5, at 110 (“Certainly some raids involved small bands of young men bent on acquiring horses 
or proving their bravery, and nascent stockowners or hungry hunters tempted by the prospect of such 
docile prey as sheep. But just as often, raiders avenged attacks on their kin and the capture of wives, 
sisters, and children.”).  
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U.S. military, under the leadership of Kit Carson, engaged in a scorched-
earth campaign in 1863 and 1864, burning Diné crops, cutting down peach 
orchards, and poisoning wells.17 The Diné had little choice but to surrender, 
after which they were led on a forced march to Bosque Redondo, an 
internment camp where they lived for four years.18 In 1868, the Diné 
succeeded in negotiating a treaty that allowed them to return to their 
traditional homeland19 within the four sacred mountains of Blanca Peak, 
Mount Taylor, San Francisco Peaks, and Mount Hesperus. 
Upon their return, the Diné spread out. Under the terms of the 1868 
treaty, the Diné received 15,000 sheep and an area of land that was too small 
to support the tribe.20 So, they ignored the 1868 reservation boundaries, 
moving “off-reservation” with their herds. Even the U.S. government 
recognized that the Diné needed more land, and—at a time when most tribes 
were suffering land losses through allotment—the reservation grew with the 
tribe through successive land grants. Herds expanded through careful animal 
husbandry, such that by the 1930s, the Diné had more than a million sheep.21 
Henry Chee Dodge and his wife Náníbaa’ “owned five thousand head of 
sheep, controlled 131,000 acres of reservation land, and possessed the 
largest private bank account in nearby Gallup.”22 Dodge was not only the 
wealthiest tribal member, he was also the first Chairman of the Navajo 
Business Council.23 But sheep and goats were not important only to the Diné 
elite; livestock was the primary form of wealth for most Diné families.24 
Relative status was connected to herd size,25 and herds were one of the 
principle material gifts given to children upon marriage and through 
                                                                                                                     
17 Navajo Nation, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/navajo/navajonation/ (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2019) (“Colonel Kit Carson instituted a scorched earth policy, burning Navajo fields and homes, 
and stealing or killing their livestock. After starving the Navajos into submission, Carson rounded up 
every Navajo he could find - 8,000 men, women and children - and in the spring of 1864 forced his 
prisoners to march some 300 miles to Fort Sumner, New Mexico. Navajos call this ‘The Long Walk.’”). 
18 See William H. Wroth, Navajo Long Walk to Bosque Redondo-1864, 
NEWMEXICOHISTORY.ORG, http://newmexicohistory.org/people/navajo-long-walk-to-bosque-redondo-
1864 (last visited Mar. 20, 2019) (detailing the Navajos’ journey to Bosque Redondo Fort and living 
conditions at the camp). 
19 Id. (“The suffering of the Navajos at Bosque Redondo continued through bureaucratic wrangling 
and delays until May 1868 when finally a treaty was signed with them at Fort Sumner and they were 
allowed to return to their homelands.”). 
20 Kevin Tehan, Of Indians, Land, and the Federal Government: The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, 
1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 178 (1976) (“The treaty allowed the Navajo less than one-fourth of their former 
territory . . . .”); Wroth, supra note 18. 
21 See IVERSON, supra note 3, at 139. 
22 ANDREW NEEDHAM, POWERLINES: PHOENIX AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SOUTHWEST 44 
(2016). 
23 Id. 
24 Tehan, supra note 20, at 177 (“Animal husbandry has been part of the Navajo social structure 
since its earliest days; sheep serve as a measure of wealth and a means of exchange. The relationship 
between the Navajo and their sheep transcends a simple owner-object owned situation, for the Navajo is 
‘linked to his herds’ by ties ‘in which he and his family’s continuity and well being, as well as his own 
self-image are symbolized by his herds.’” (quoting JAMES F. DOWNS, THE NAVAJO 114 (1972)). 
25 Id. 
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inheritance.26 Wool, which was sold to traders, exchanged at trading posts 
for food, and made into rugs, provided a significant source of income across 
the reservation. Animals also provided security: in lean times, they protected 
families from starvation. For most Diné, animals were and are not merely 
resources but instead part of the family unit.  
In the 1930s, the federal government attacked the Navajo herds and, in 
the process, attacked the material foundation of Diné society. The Roosevelt 
administration decided the Navajo reservation was suffering from an 
overgrazing problem and unilaterally decided to impose a livestock 
reduction program. Championed by the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs during the New Deal, John Collier, livestock reduction struck 
at the Diné way of life.27 Collier was known as an Indian reformer, and his 
most significant contribution to Indian policy was the Indian Reorganization 
Act (IRA)—legislation that provided a framework for tribes to take on 
aspects of sovereignty that had been denied to them during allotment.28 But 
for Diné, Collier’s name remains synonymous with livestock reduction. 
When it came time for the Diné to vote on whether to adopt an IRA form of 
government, they voted against doing so, driven primarily by anger over 
livestock reduction.29  
The idea that the Navajos had too many sheep originated in reports from 
experts who warned that the tribe faced catastrophic soil erosion. Engineers 
working on completing the Boulder Dam, now called the Hoover Dam, also 
feared that Navajo overgrazing—which could cause silt to fill up behind the 
dam—threatened the dam’s utility.30 A U.S. Geological Survey report called 
the Navajo reservation “practically ‘Public Enemy No. 1’ in causing the 
Colorado Silt problem.”31 Additionally, overgrazing caused deep scars, 
arroyos, to form on the land and created further desertification that 
threatened to erode the range carrying capacity of much of the reservation. 
Experts used photos to show growth of these arroyos and draw attention to 
problems of erosion.32 From the perspective of Washington scientists and 
                                                                                                                     
26 DOWNS, supra note 24, at 30 (“A Navajo father is expected to give livestock and horses to his 
children, particularly his sons.”). 
27 See TRACI BRYNNE VOYLES, WASTELANDING: LEGACIES OF URANIUM MINING IN NAVAJO 
COUNTRY 39–40 (2015) (highlighting differences in how Diné versus non-Indians understood livestock 
and the ways in which stock reduction changed Diné society).  
28 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, §§ 1–19, 73 Stat. 984, 984–88 (1934). 
29 Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 
955, 972 (1972) (“During the two-year period within which tribes could accept or reject the IRA, 258 
elections were held. In these elections, 181 tribes (129,750 Indians) accepted the Act and 77 tribes 
(86,865 Indians, including 45,000 Navajos) rejected it.”). 
30 KLARA B. KELLEY, NAVAJO LAND USE: AN ETHNOARCHAEOLOGICAL STUDY 9 (1986) (“The 
industrial growth of southern California required that Navajos reduce their livestock to stem overgrazing 
and the resulting soil erosion, which threatened to silt up Boulder Dam, the source of electricity that was 
to power California’s growth.”). 
31 NEEDHAM, supra note 22, at 47.   
32 See, e.g., J. W. Hoover, Navajo Land Problems, 13 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 281, 286–89 (1937) 
(explaining the problem of erosion due to overgrazing and providing photos of arroyo development).  
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policy-makers, experts had to protect the tribe from itself, otherwise Navajos 
would inadvertently ruin their own territory; something had to be done.33 
That something was livestock reduction.  
But for the Diné, the insistence that they reduce the number of sheep, 
goats, and horses on the reservation was not a minor administrative change, 
it was an existential threat to Diné livelihood, identity, and way of life. The 
Diné had been through droughts and bad spells before but felt that if they 
lived according to their traditional values, the hard years would give way to 
better ones. Tribal leaders felt that solutions to overgrazing should come 
from the tribe, not be dictated by Washington.34 But that is not what 
ultimately happened; the United States, aided by a thin veneer of tribal buy-
in, forced a devastating livestock reduction program upon the Diné people.35 
Federal officials raised stock reduction as an issue before the Council in 
1928,36 but livestock reduction was not implemented until the Roosevelt 
Administration. Told that they had little choice and that additional jobs and 
land grants to the tribe would accompany stock reduction to help offset the 
pain of culling the herds, the Council voted to approve a federal voluntary 
reduction plan in 1933.37 Experts of all stripes descended on the 
reservation.38 Parts of the reservation were fenced off as demonstration sites 
                                                                                                                     
33 See VOYLES, supra note 27, at 28 (“The notion that indigenous relationships to the land had 
driven it to ruin, in short, promoted colonial agendas of control, coercion, and assimilation. In the context 
of livestock reduction on Navajo land in the 1930s, this colonial declensionist narrative was compounded 
by the culture of conservationism in federal resource management, an efficiency-oriented approach to 
resources that was starkly juxtaposed against what was seen as an irrational Navajo land use that 
produced a landscape desperately in need of salvation.”); Marsha Weisiger, Gendered Injustice: Navajo 
Livestock Reduction in the New Deal Era, 38 W. HIST. Q. 437, 440 (2007) (“Collier believed that if the 
range continued to deteriorate, sheep and goats would starve, and ultimately, so would Navajos.”). 
34 See Tom Dodge, Speech (Oct. 30, 1933), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”: DINÉ LETTERS, 
SPEECHES & PETITIONS 1900-1960 166, 168 (Peter Iverson & Monty Roessel eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
“FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”] (“I know from my own observations that the reservation as a whole is very 
much over-grazed. We Navajos should organize in some way or other to at least stop the process of 
erosion. We ourselves should take the lead in dealing with this question of erosion. We should not be 
driven to it by outside people. We ourselves should take the initiative. We should not hold back hoping 
that the conditions will be better themselves without our help. Certainly the conditions will not be 
improved if we graze our sheep as we have been doing in the past. One way of dealing with the question 
is range control. And certainly there is a great need of range management or control. Those who own 
sheep and goats should organize or agree among themselves to establish some form of range control. 
Thos[e] who own livestock should take the lead. This should not be forced upon them from 
Washington.”). 
35 See IVERSON, supra note 3, at 139 (discussing how “the federal government made several 
attempts to reduce Navajo livestock holdings” and through its livestock reduction program “tried to 
change Diné practices and beliefs”). 
36 KELLEY, supra note 30, at 98.  
37 See AUBREY W. WILLIAMS, JR., NAVAJO POLITICAL PROCESS 28 (1970) (“The Navajo Tribal 
Council, in a meeting at Tuba City in November 1933, passed a resolution sanctioning a voluntary stock 
reduction program with the stipulation that the Government attempt to secure additional grazing lands 
outside of the reservation.”). 
38 VOYLES, supra note 27, at 47 (“During the stock reduction period, a veritable flood of federal 
experts, ranging from ecologists, conservationists, agronomists, and cartographers, to social workers, 
anthropologists, and economists, descended on the reservation.”). 
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to show how the range could recover with proper care. Estimating that the 
reservation had double as much livestock as the range could support, agents 
began culling the herds.39 In theory, agents told tribal members they had to 
reduce their herds and then paid for sheep turned over to them. But the first 
round of livestock reduction was not terribly successful. Diné families got 
rid of their least productive animals, keeping the younger sheep in order to 
rebuild their herds later. That is not to say that reduction was a voluntary 
program. After imposing a cap on the number of animals a family could 
have, those responsible for carrying out the reduction would force sales—
by telling Navajos that they had no choice—at prices that were supposed to 
be fair but were below what Diné would have willingly accepted for their 
animals.40 Subsequent rounds were more heavy-handed.  
Livestock reduction struck the poorest Diné families the hardest.41 The 
largest stock owners, such as Dodge and other elites, raised their stock to 
sell to outside markets, but those with smaller holdings lived with their 
animals, eking out a subsistence living. For the poor, each animal was part 
of their family, and they were living close enough to the edge to know that 
the loss of even a small part of their herd could have tragic consequences. 
The poor disproportionately owned goats, so when the federal government 
decided to target goats, it was also targeting the poor. Even across-the-board 
decisions, such as reducing every family’s herd by five sheep, involved 
much greater relative hardship for poorer families with smaller herds.42 A 
similar dynamic occurred when chapter officials implemented reduction 
according to pasture quality, making decisions about allowable herd sizes 
according to the carrying capacity of each family’s traditional use area.43 
Because large stock owners controlled the best pasture land, tying reductions 
to land quality also tended to hurt the poor.44 Collier was not blind to these 
equity issues, but efforts to put caps on herd size invited challenges based 
on different definitions of family and ownership. Simply declaring that no 
one could have a herd above 1,000 head did not solve the problem because 
many different members of a large extended family might in fact own sheep 
within a larger herd. An observable herd associated with a single Diné 
couple could include sheep owned—in reality or at least for the purpose of 
avoiding the demands of reduction—by various aunts, uncles, cousins, and 
                                                                                                                     
39 O. N. Hicks, The First American and His Range Resource, 23 J. RANGE MGMT. 391, 393 (1970).  
40 See KELLEY, supra note 30, at 100; WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 39. See also LAWRENCE DAVID 
WEISS, DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN THE NAVAJO NATION: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY 99 
(1984) (noting that “[m]uch of the reduction was effected by the government offering prices substantially 
above market value for Navajo stock” and explaining the market prices were relatively low because of 
the Great Depression). 
41 KELLEY, supra note 30, at 100.  
42 WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 39. 
43 Id.   
44 Id. 
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children.45 Cutting through such family and cross-cultural minefields was 
naturally hard,46 and, along with the political might of the largest 
stockowners, it limited the ability and appetite of officials to use livestock 
reduction as a mechanism for advancing equity. Instead, those who could 
least afford to lose part of their herd bore the brunt of livestock reduction.47 
Livestock reduction also exacted a heavy emotional and financial toll on 
the Diné. Rather than go to the expense of transporting animals to off-
reservation slaughterhouses already overwhelmed by Navajo sheep, agents 
would sometimes kill the animals in front of families still grieving over 
having to surrender them.48 Though livestock reduction took place in the 
midst of the Great Depression, some of the animals “were merely shot and 
left to rot”—a level of waste that Navajos “were incapable of 
understanding.”49 Navajos who resisted reduction by hiding or refraining 
from turning over their animals were imprisoned or faced other forms of 
judicial enforcement.50 The Diné intensely disliked stock reduction. In a 
letter written to John Collier in 1936, Chee Dodge reported, “the tribe is 
practically unanimous in their determination to turn [further reduction] 
down.”51 The vote of some members of the Council in 1937 in support of 
stock reduction inspired “[a] virtual storm of protest.”52 Most damaging, for 
a tribe that had been identified as “self-supporting” by the Meriam Report 
                                                                                                                     
45 Interview with E.R. Fryer and Tribal Council Members (May 15, 1939), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO 
PEOPLE”, supra note 34, at 20 (describing the practice of extended family members sharing livestock in 
a single herd).  
46 The favored definition of the U.S. government was based on residence, but such a standard 
worked to incentivize the breaking up of large family units. See Interview with E.R. Fryer and Tribal 
Council Members (May 15, 1939), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”, supra note 34, at 20. Fryer explained 
how the Indian Service defines family for the purpose of stock reduction: “Usually we name the head of 
the family. If they live together and share things and operate as a family it is considered a family. They 
may have a son-in-law who does not own any sheep but has two or three horses. He is part of that family 
group if he lives with his father-in-law and shares income.” Id. 
47 See WEISS, supra note 40, at 101 (“The effect of these inequities against smaller herders were 
such that, in the aggregate, smaller herders were reduced by 23.1 percent while larger herders were 
reduced by only 5.4 percent of their prereduction size.”). 
48 See KATHLEEN P. CHAMBERLAIN, UNDER SACRED GROUND: A HISTORY OF NAVAJO OIL, 1922-
1982 73 (2008) (discussing the goat reductions of 1934); KLARA B. KELLEY & PETER M. WHITELEY, 
NAVAJOLAND: FAMILY SETTLEMENT AND LAND USE 103 (1989) (“Thirty-five hundred goats from 
Navajo Mountain area ‘were shot and left in heaps to rot’ near Inscription House because the cost of 
driving them to the railroad was prohibitive.”); see also NEEDHAM, supra note 22, at 48 (“Furthermore, 
some BIA officials carried out reduction with marked cruelty. On occasion, agents shot animals and 
burned their carcasses in front of astonished families that had formed lifelong relationships with those 
animals.”).   
49 LAWRENCE C. KELLY, THE NAVAJO INDIANS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY: 1900-1935 162 
(1968).  
50 See KELLEY, supra note 30, at 101 (“Between 1939 and 1943, the Indian Service secured court 
judgments against several Navajos accused of violating the grazing regulations, and those judgments 
broke the Navajo resistance.”). 
51 Letter from Tom Dodge to John Collier (May 7, 1936), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”, supra 
note 34, at 176.  
52 WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 29.  
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in 1928,53 stock reduction threatened to make it impossible for many Diné 
families to earn enough money to care for themselves. In 1940, tribal 
members observed, “[f]rom a tribe self-sufficient and self-supporting, the 
Bureau is forcing us to become depend[e]nt upon charity for our subsistence. 
We only desire to be financially independent and make our own way.”54 And 
in the same year, a delegate argued before the Council, “What I mean is we 
cannot stand any more reduction. We are all going to fall into a big hungry 
lot.”55 
Ultimately, stock reduction succeeded in pushing down the number of 
sheep on the reservation, but it did so by undercutting tribal economic 
independence and the Diné way of life. Prior to stock reduction, Navajos had 
more than one million sheep; by 1946, that number was more than halved to 
449,000 sheep on the reservation.56 Prior to stock reduction, of course, the 
Diné were connected to the larger society and to external markets. Off-
reservation demand for wool and Navajo rugs, in part, drove the growth of 
Diné herds. But Diné families could meet such demand in ways that largely 
preserved their isolation from the Bilagáana (the Diné word for non-Indians, 
which can be translated as “white, the other, or the enemy”) world and 
continued traditional ways of life. Stock reduction threw a wrench in the 
engine of Diné economic growth and self-sufficiency. Collier promised the 
Council that new employment opportunities would fill the economic holes 
created by stock reduction, and many Diné did find jobs working for New 
Deal government programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps and the 
Soil Conservation Corps.57 But the promised jobs did not fully offset stock 
reduction losses,58 nor did such jobs continue in the post-war period.  
For the Diné, stock reduction is remembered as a trauma approaching 
that of their earlier internment at Bosque Redondo.59 Families living at near 
subsistence levels could ill afford stock reduction, and even those who were 
better off suffered dramatic wealth declines.60 Collier’s hope was that stock 
                                                                                                                     
53 LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 504 (1928).  
54 Letter from Scott Preston, Julius Begay, Frank Goldtooth, and Judge Many Children to 
Representative John R. Murdock (Feb. 14, 1940), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”, supra note 34, at 23–
24.  
55 Speech by Manuel Denetso at the Navajo Council (July 5, 1940), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”, 
supra note 34, at 27.  
56 VOYLES, supra note 27, at 39, 52. 
57 KELLEY, supra note 30, at 99.   
58 NEEDHAM, supra note 21, at 48.   
59 Peace and Livestock, in BETWEEN SACRED MOUNTAINS: NAVAJO STORIES AND LESSONS FROM 
THE LAND 155, 155 (Sam Bingham et al. eds., 1982) (“The cutting down of livestock is known as Stock 
Reduction, and people remember it with sadness the way they remember Fort Sumner.”). See also 
CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 48, at 83 (explaining that “stock reduction rivaled the Long Walk in its 
devastating consequences”). 
60 See Letter from Chee Dodge to James Stewart, Land Dep’t, Indian Office, Dep’t of Indian Affairs 
(Apr. 20, 1936), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”, supra note 34, at 173 (“The Indians have all been excited 
for the last two or three years anyway, because they didn’t know whether they were going to lose their 
stock, whether they were going broke or would have anything to eat.”). 
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reduction would protect Diné self-sufficiency by preventing overgrazing 
from ruining the range, but ironically, stock reduction forced the Diné into 
dependency.61 As Kathleen Chamberlain notes in her fabulous history, 
Under Sacred Ground: A History of Navajo Oil, 1922-1982, “[m]any 
Navajos lost their livelihood altogether and were forced to accept 
government subsidies for the first time.”62 In a 1940 letter to Senator Dennis 
Chavez, Deshna Clah Cheschillige complained, “Many of our people are 
now poor and are forced to live on relief. We do not like relief and want to 
make our own living and we know we can do so if we are left alone.”63 While 
New Deal job programs protected against the worst effects of reduction, 
when that sort of support disappeared in the post-World War II period, bad 
weather and a devastated economy left Diné not at risk of starving, but 
actually starving. Emergency relief came to the reservation after popular 
magazines published photo essays of the poor conditions on the reservation. 
And to this day, Diné receive welfare in a form that is not common among 
other places in the United States: commodities such as bread, cheese, and 
surplus canned goods. High poverty rates and welfare dependency cannot be 
attributed entirely or even primarily to stock reduction of course, but stock 
reduction had a devastating impact on tribal agency and independence. 
Backlash against stock reduction contributed to the Diné vote against the 
proposed IRA form of government, but rather than celebrating this example 
of a tribe exercising independent judgment, something Collier claimed to 
support, Collier arguably hardened his resolve to carry out stock reduction.64 
Although Collier supported tribal governance rhetorically, for the Diné, 
Collier was the worst sort of Bilagáana; he may not have burned down their 
peach orchards, but he took away their sheep.  
The stock reduction program provided clear evidence to the Diné that 
the United States was ultimately in charge of the reservation economy. From 
the time Diné returned from Bosque Redondo in 1868 until the stock 
reduction program, the Diné economy could be described as internally 
managed. Though there were of course external forces such as market 
demand for Diné products and pressure to not extend the reservation into 
                                                                                                                     
61 RICHARD WRIGHT, THE ROOTS OF DEPENDENCY: SUBSISTENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE AMONG THE CHOCTAWS, PAWNEES, AND NAVAJOS 313 (1983) (“Coming to the Navajos with a 
program promising economic rehabilitation, Collier had crippled their way of life and accelerated the 
onset of dependency.”).  
62 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 48, at 73. See also MICHAEL JOSEPH FRANCISCONI, KINSHIP, 
CAPITALISM, CHANGE: THE INFORMAL ECONOMY OF THE NAVAJO, 1868-1995 58 (1998) (“Stock 
reduction of the 1930’s reduced by fifty percent the total number of sheep on the reservation and 
dramatically changed the economic livelihood and social status of many families. Before the livestock 
cuts, Diné were self-sufficient, but following them, supplemental income from wage labor and/or welfare 
became sufficient.”).  
63 Letter from Deshna Clah Cheschillige to Senator Dennis Chavez (Dec. 8, 1940), in “FOR OUR 
NAVAJO PEOPLE”, supra note 34, at 143. 
64 See DONALD L. FIXICO, INDIAN RESILIENCE AND REBUILDING: INDIGENOUS NATIONS IN THE 
MODERN AMERICAN WEST 85, 87 (2013).  
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areas with non-Indian ranching interests, the Diné made independent choices 
regarding how to respond to those forces. As a people, they had done well 
even in the face of tremendous obstacles. Though the society beyond the 
reservation border assumed the Diné would die off and that their culture 
would fade, they rebuilt their herds and their population. Stock reduction 
changed the narrative by substituting Diné priorities with Washington 
edicts.65  
The Diné belief that the range would recover and that the Diné should 
manage their own agriculture was pushed aside by New Deal bureaucrats 
confident that they knew better.66 Diné knowledge of the land tied to the 
tribe’s experience living between the four sacred mountains since before 
Spanish contact was brushed aside. The point is not that nothing should have 
been done to protect the reservation against overgrazing and desertification 
but that the stock reduction program, in part because it was externally-
imposed, crippled the tribe’s ability to right itself. Similarly, the move to 
wage labor was already well underway—it was “clear by the 1930s that the 
Navajo could ‘no longer live by sheep alone’”—before being pushed by 
Washington.67 Navajos warned U.S. officials that the livestock levels 
envisioned in the stock reduction program would impoverish tribal 
members,68 yet the program went forward. Tribal members correctly saw 
stock reduction as a threat to their way-of-life. Compounding the problems 
that could have come from any livestock reduction program, which would 
have been difficult enough on its own, is that the New Deal program was 
done in a heavy-handed way by a foreign, historically-hostile government.69   
The Navajo Tribal Council convinced the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) to effectively end the stock reduction program at the end of World 
War II,70 and since then, efforts to restore the range have been much less 
                                                                                                                     
65 In his account of livestock reduction, former Navajo Nation Council member Henry Zah noted, 
“the government took away much of our stock when it increased too much, after the government had 
warned the Diné about the conditions of the land. This had been warned when the sheep were given. The 
Diné had increased their livestock, and it was thought of as if the sheep still belonged to Wááshindoon.” 
Henry Zah, Henry Zah, in NAVAJO STORIES OF THE LONG WALK PERIOD 156, 157 (Broderick H. Johnson 
ed., 1973) (Diné pronunciation of Washington in the original).  
66 WEISIGER, supra note 16, at 7 (“With missionary zeal, they imposed on the Navajos an 
experimental program based on the emerging sciences of ecology and soil conservation, while 
disparaging local knowledge and ignoring the importance of long-established cultural patterns.”).  
67 PHILIP RENO, MOTHER EARTH, FATHER SKY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: NAVAJO 
RESOURCES AND THEIR USE 29 (1981). 
68 See Letter from Scott Preston, Julius Begay, Frank Goldtooth, and Judge Many Children to 
Representative John R. Murdock (Feb. 14, 1940), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”, supra note 34, at 23 
(“282 sheep units is not sufficient for even the bare existence of a moderate size Navajo family without 
additional income, and such a policy will mean the impoverishment of the entire Navajo Tribe.”). 
69 See FRANCISCONI, supra note 62, at 50 (“Stock reduction was perhaps one of the most poorly 
managed programs of the New Deal era. To begin with, it was imposed upon the Diné from the outside, 
and, in spite of the proclaimed good intentions, clearly represented the colonial nature of reservations in 
the U.S.”). 
70 KELLEY, supra note 30, at 102. 
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ambitious.71 Grazing, while still important culturally and still part of tribal 
identity, became a matter of secondary importance with the rise of the wage 
economy after the war. Spurred along in part by the termination era policy 
of encouraging tribal members to leave reservations under the Indian 
Relocation Act of 1956,72 many Diné found work off-reservation. The 
inability of the Navajo range to provide a suitable livelihood for the entire 
tribe was an additional contributing factor.73 These push-and-pull factors, 
combined with Window Rock’s almost singular focus on using extractive 
industry development to maximize tribal revenue over the past six-plus 
decades, left matters of grazing regulation and enforcement neglected.74 
The neglect takes a number of forms. First, because the permit system 
was allowed to become ossified, there has been a corresponding increase in 
the importance of inherited rights.75 Second, tribal politicians balk at 
pursuing land reform because of the high political cost of even proposing 
changing the existing system.76  
Though the federal government backed off after World War II, creating 
space for tribally-led reform, memories of the stock reduction program 
effectively paralyzed efforts by the tribal government to address the 
problems of overgrazing.77 Tribal members resist efforts, by the central tribal 
government and by their chapter, to reign in herd size or deal with the wild 
mustang problem.78 Council delegates, recognizing that reform of grazing 
and customary use rights amounts to the third rail of tribal politics, avoid 
real engagement with the issue, and tribal agency work rarely advances 
beyond the planning stage.79 Meanwhile, not only does deterioration of the 
                                                                                                                     
71 See, e.g., Lynn Fuller, Desertification on the Navajo Reservation: A Legal and Historical 
Analysis, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 258 (1989) (“Navajo governmental authorities were politically 
unwilling or unable to enforce the grazing regulations . . . .”). 
72 STAN JUNEAU, HISTORY AND FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN EDUCATION 42 (2012–2013). 
73 See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 71, at 231–32 (discussing the extreme desertification of Navajo lands 
due to overgrazing by livestock and the impacts on the Navajo people). 
74 See id. at 258 (explaining that “[e]conomic development efforts focused on exploiting non-
renewable natural resources on the reservation” and that “[t]he tribal government in Window Rock did 
not take seriously the need for improving range productivity”). For a lengthy discussion of Navajo natural 
resource exploitation, see generally Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and Reservation Resources, 40 
ENVTL. L. 437 (2010).  
75 See Riggs v. Estate of Attakai, 9 Navajo Rptr. 119, 121 (Navajo 2007) (“By placing the grazing 
permit with Sista Riggs, there is assurance that the land and herd will remain with the family, and that 
the grazing permit will remain intact . . . .”). 
76 See Fuller, supra note 71, at 231, 280 (explaining that political pressures have resulted in 
ineffective and abused range-management controls). 
77 Id. at 231. 
78 See JULIE NANIA ET AL., CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND VARIABILITY 
ADAPTATION ON THE NAVAJO NATION 99 (2014), 
http://cires.colorado.edu/outreach/system/files/projects/tribes_eye.pdf (discussing the resistance by the 
Navajo to address feral animals, especially mustangs, that contribute to overgrazing of the range).   
79 See Gary D. Libecap & Ronald N. Johnson, Legislating Commons: The Navajo Tribal Council 
and the Navajo Range, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 69, 69–70 (1980) (“Because of high enforcement costs [for] 
small herds and high political costs for elected officials, the Tribal Council since 1956 has not enforced 
grazing regulations.”). 
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range and desertification of the reservation continue, but non-agricultural 
development also remains bottled up, trapped by the hold the existing system 
has on unused land.80 
II. GRAZING RIGHTS AND CONTROL OF THE LAND 
The Navajo Nation requires that tribal members have a grazing permit 
in order to graze their animals on the Navajo range.81 Measurements in the 
system are based on sheep units, with one horse, mule, or burro equal to five 
sheep; one cow equal to four sheep; and one goat counted as one sheep unit.82 
Grazing permits are limited geographically, and permittees cannot have 
more than ten horses or more than 350 total sheep units in theory.83 However, 
when the tribe conducted a livestock inventory of select grazing districts in 
2001, there were 403,138 sheep units found even though the number of 
permitted sheep units in those districts was only 285,346.84 Because these 
figures did not include feral or penned animals, even these elevated figures 
do not reflect the actual number of sheep units in these districts.85 Grazing 
regulation and enforcement generally falls upon district grazing 
committees.86 Their authority extends to the question of whether tribal 
members can fence portions of the range.87 The Navajo Nation Code directly 
incorporates language from the 1957 Navajo Reservation Grazing 
Handbook,88 which lists as one of the purposes of the grazing regulation 
“[t]he adjustment of livestock numbers to the carrying capacity of the range 
in such a manner that the livestock economy of the Navajo Nation will be 
preserved.”89 The regulations allow for the issuance of new permits to tribal 
members over age eighteen whenever the district’s carrying capacity has not 
been exceeded.90 Finally, though there are grazing fees associated with the 
use of non-trust land owned by the Navajo Nation, tribal members are not 
                                                                                                                     
80 See Mark Schoepfle et al., Navajo Attitudes Toward Development and Change: A Unified 
Ethnographic and Survey Approach to an Understanding of Their Future, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 
885, 895, 901 (1984) (explaining that the survey found the Navajo people identified the loss of the grazing 
permit, and thus access to their land, as the most severe threat and that the Navajo will not support 
development if it interferes with tradition). 
81 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 781(A) (2010); see also NANIA ET AL., supra note 78, at 
101 (“In order to graze [livestock] on the range, a Navajo grazing permit is required.”). 
82 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 706(D) (2010).  
83 Id. § 781(C).  
84 NANIA ET AL., supra note 78, at 101. 
85 Id.  
86 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 171 (2010).  
87 Id.  
88 See 3 N.T.C. § 282 (1962) (citing the 1957 Navajo Reservation Grazing Handbook in the statutory 
history of the general regulations). 
89 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 703(C) (2010); see also 3 N.T.C. § 283 (1962) (citing pages 
8 and 9 of the 1957 Navajo Reservation Grazing Handbook in the history for subsection (c), which states, 
“[t]he adjustment of livestock numbers to the carrying capacity of the range in such a manner that the 
livestock economy of the Navajo Tribe will be preserved”).  
90 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 3, §§ 708(A)–(B) (2010). 
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charged grazing fees for permitted use of trust land.91 
The cultural significance of grazing, coupled with limits on the issuance 
of new permissions, makes grazing permits a highly valued possession on 
the reservation.92 Conflicts involving grazing permits, between both 
neighbors and family members, are frequent and often heated. The Navajo 
Supreme Court, in Begay v. Keedah, established five factors for determining 
who should be awarded a contested grazing permit: first, animal units in 
grazing permits must be sufficiently large to be economically viable; second, 
land must be put to its most beneficial use; third, the most logical heir should 
receive land use rights; fourth, use rights must not be fragmented; and fifth, 
only those who are personally involved in the beneficial use of land may 
inherit it.93  
Although standard stories of Indian versus non-Indian uses of land tend 
to focus on the extent to which non-Indians prioritize beneficial use, as these 
factors show, Navajo law emphasizes economic viability, beneficial use, and 
concern with the risks that come from overly fragmented rights. The fifth 
Begay factor demonstrates a departure from off-reservation understandings 
of property because, for Diné, ownership interests in grazing permits are 
dependent upon personal use.94 Factor five’s use requirement does not 
square easily with non-Indian property rights, which largely accept the 
severability of use and ownership.95 But by including use as a prerequisite 
for being awarded a contested grazing permit, the Navajo Supreme Court 
affirmed traditional Diné practices, which emphasize use as the basis of 
property rights.96 As the Court noted in Begay, “[a]nother aspect of 
traditional Navajo land tenure is the principle that one must use it or lose 
it.”97 
When the inheritance of grazing rights came before the Navajo Supreme 
Court again in 2007, the Court reaffirmed traditional Diné understandings 
of property, even where they break from non-Indian notions of equality.98 In 
                                                                                                                     
91 Id. § 709.  
92 See Estate of Navajo Joe, 4 Navajo Rptr. 99, 99 (Navajo 1983) (“[A] grazing permit is one of the 
most important items of property which a Navajo may own.”).  
93 6 Navajo Rptr. 416, 421 (Navajo 1991); see also In re Quiet Title to Livestock Grazing Permit 
No. 8-487 Formerly Held by Martha Francis, No. SC-CV-41-09, slip op. at 6–7 (Navajo Dec. 29, 2011) 
(summarizing the five factors articulated by Begay v. Keedah when determining whether to award a 
grazing permit).   
94 See RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF 
TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 190 (2009) (explaining that Navajo policy for land-use permits is to grant 
permits to “individuals who will make the most beneficial use of land,” which “equates to the use it or 
lose it rule”). 
95 See id. (explaining the difference between Navajo land use policies and property law in the 
Anglo-American legal system). 
96 See Riggs v. Estate of Attakai, 9 Navajo Rptr. 119, 120–21 (Navajo 2007) (emphasizing the 
importance of Navajo Nation policies regarding personal land use and prevention of fragmentation when 
awarding land use permits).  
97 Begay, 6 Navajo Rptr. at 421.  
98 Riggs, 9 Navajo Rptr. at 120–21. 
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2002, the Navajo Nation Council passed Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii, or, in 
English, The Foundation of the Diné, Diné Law, and Diné Government.99 
Though Navajo Fundamental Law, as it is also called, does not include 
provisions that expressly address how courts should resolve conflicts 
involving land rights, it emphasizes tradition and kinship (k’é).100 Applying 
the Begay factors in a subsequent case, the Navajo Supreme Court added a 
preference for women when it comes to grazing permits.101 The Navajo 
Supreme Court ruled that the Begay factors had to be interpreted in light of 
Navajo Fundamental Law, which recognizes that “Navajos maintain and 
carry on the custom that the maternal clan maintains traditional grazing and 
farming areas.”102 To outsiders, such overt sexism might seem jarring, but 
matrilineal control over the homestead and overgrazing is very much a part 
of Navajo culture.103 The gender-modified Begay factors remain the law 
today. These cases highlight both the challenge of determining what to do 
with grazing rights following the death of the previous permittee and the 
importance of grazing rights in defining land rights more generally on the 
reservation.  
Though, formally, grazing rights involve merely the right of permittees 
to graze their animals on tribal trust land, permittees typically understand 
their grazing rights as providing them an ownership interest in the 
underlying land. “[Grazing] permittees view themselves as the de facto 
owners of the land and therefore believe they have the right to decide how 
the land is to be used. The permittees pass their rights from generation to 
generation, and they are often conservative.”104 Though, at times, the tribe 
has tried to impose limits on the power of permittees to determine how 
“their” land is used, the tribe has largely gone along—except when such 
claims conflict with the interests of extractive industry—with permittees’ 
expansive understanding of the nature of grazing rights. What this means in 
practice is that development proposals that threaten, or seem to threaten, the 
rights of permittees often die on the drawing board. Even though a particular 
project, say a new school or store, might use only a small amount of land 
relative to the reservation’s seemingly endless open land, grazing permittees 
                                                                                                                     
99 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 201–06 (2010).  
100 For more on Navajo Fundamental Law, see Kenneth Bobroff, Diné Bi Beenahaz’áanii: 
Codifying Indigenous Consuetudinary Law in the 21st Century, 5 TRIBAL L.J. 4 (2005), which explains 
k’é as the Navajo clan system that maintains healthy bloodlines and avoids incest; k’é is considered the 
“foundation of all laws.”   
101 Riggs, 9 Navajo Rptr. at 120. 
102 In re Quiet Title to Livestock Grazing Permit No. 8-487 Formerly Held by Martha Francis, No. 
SC-CV-41-09, slip op. at 7 (Navajo Dec. 29, 2011). 
103 See Riggs, 9 Navajo Rptr. at 120 (“Navajo Fundamental Law . . . defines the role and authority 
of Diné women in [Navajo] society. Traditionally, women are central to the home and land base.”). For 
more on gender-based governance in Indian communities generally, see Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) 
Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 842–44 (2007).  
104 DAVID LISTOKIN ET AL., HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY: 
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY 335 (2006) (internal citation omitted). 
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as a class often thwart such projects.105 Opposition by a single permittee can 
derail a project irrespective of the extent to which the project responds to 
recognized community needs. Multiple legal and political factors empower 
grazing permittees to block development.  
Grazing permittees currently can exploit the “raw”106 status of most 
reservation land to block development. Because most reservation land has 
not been zoned, it remains “raw” land, meaning that any proposed change 
invites a fight with those who prefer the status quo. If each locality used 
zoning to set aside some areas for residential or business development, 
grazing permittees would have less ground to contest development 
proposals. They could, of course, contest the initial zoning decision and the 
appropriateness of development generally, but zoning would front-load such 
debates, making planning permission less contentious for individual 
entrepreneurs or tribal members seeking permission for their particular 
proposals. Zoning also would help depoliticize the process of approving 
development proposals. In many rural chapters, families with the longest, 
deepest connection to the area have the most political power. Rivalry at the 
family or clan level can lead chapters, using grazing rights as cover, to reject 
development proposals—regardless of the merits of the proposal—if they 
come from the “wrong” family or clan. Zoning could provide a check on the 
power grazing permittees have over all development.  
In some respects, the secondary interest in land tied to grazing provides 
permit holders greater ability to maintain the range undisturbed than if they 
owned the land outright. Land ownership typically comes with rigid 
boundary lines that serve to define the space over which owners enjoy 
presumptive control.107 Off-reservation landowners enjoy broad 
exclusionary and development rights within the four corners of their 
individual plot, but they have much more limited authority when it comes to 
what happens beyond their property boundaries. Grazing rights are different. 
The territory over which a grazing right attaches is often defined loosely, 
based on informal understandings of family claims to the range rather than 
formal boundaries.108 Most significantly, it is common for land to be subject 
                                                                                                                     
105 See DINÉ POLICY INST., LAND REFORM IN THE NAVAJO NATION: POSSIBILITIES OF RENEWAL 
FOR OUR PEOPLE 36 (2017), 
http://hooghan.dinecollege.edu/institutes/docs/Land%20Reform%20In%20Navajo%20Nation.pdf 
(“Grazing permits and culture instill ideas of property and the authority to hinder development.”); see 
also id. at 47 (“Grazing permittees are given the authority to decide whether development occurs within 
their area and community.”). 
106 See Raw, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008) (defining raw land as “undeveloped”). 
107 For the most influential article emphasizing exclusion, see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the 
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 740–52 (1998). See also Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity 
in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 279–85 (2008) (providing a summary of the exclusion-based 
or boundary approach to property ownership).  
108 See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Agency Costs and the Assignment of Property 
Rights: The Case of Southwestern Indian Reservations, 333 47 SW. ECON. J. 332, 333 (1980) (arguing 
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to multiple grazing and customary use claims, with different families 
claiming an interest in the same area of land.109 Grazing rights are also 
amorphous enough to support even long dormant claims. Even though it 
might have been years since sheep grazed over a particular part of the range 
because grazing permittees had been keeping their sheep closer to their 
homesite, they could plausibly move their animals to that part of the range 
in the future. Any land that is withdrawn for development is a loss not only 
to the family or families with grazing rights over that part of the range, but 
to all families who use the land and rightly fear that territory within their 
grazing district might have to be adjusted as a result.110 In turn, those seeking 
development permission may face objections not just from those with 
secondary land rights directly at stake, but also from grazing permittees 
whose rights are not directly implicated.111 Consequently, the secondary 
nature of grazing rights arguably enables permittees to control a larger area 
than they would if the rights were explicitly tied to land instead of grazing. 
Commentators agree that, as a practical matter, grazing permittees enjoy 
broad veto power over reservation development.112 Permittee approval is 
required in order for projects to go forward.113 How tribal members 
experience permittee power can be seen in Louise Litzen’s struggle to open 
a laundromat near Diné College in Tsaile, Arizona:  
For eleven years, she has navigated in good faith through a 
maze of processes to obtain a business site lease. Some of her 
neighbors own grazing permits on land surrounding Diné 
College, much of which has not been used for grazing for 
generations. The refusal of any of these individuals to waive 
their grazing rights can single-handedly prevent Louise from 
opening her business.114  
                                                                                                                     
that conferral of formal grazing rights created internal tribal conflicts that “retarded the development of 
formal property rights to range land on reservations”).   
109 See infra notes 111–114 and accompanying text.  
110 See Schoepfle et al., supra note 81, at 895 (“We see that the loss of the grazing permit, which 
confers rights to land and livestock, is the most severe threat, and this establishes the Navajo view that 
maintaining access to land is the most crucial factor in maintaining the viability of Navajo life.”). 
111 Objections to development can come from other unlikely quarters as well, including from tribal 
members who are not directly involved in grazing but who want to protect their parents’ interests. See id. 
at 901 (“[T]he more educated Navajos, though more willing to tolerate various adverse effects, prefer to 
maintain access to traditional land. . . . Their purpose is to keep traditional land holdings intact. . . . They 
thus are willing to participate in development, but are not happy about an outcome in which the traditional 
way of life for their parents is sacrificed.”).  
112 See, e.g., Susan Carder, Bashas’ Diné Markets and the Navajo Nation: A Study of Cross-Cultural 
Trade, 39 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 47, 54 (2015) (“The Navajo people are granted grazing permits 
for the land. The Navajo Nation holds the land in trust but the grazing permittees have de facto veto 
power over proposed use changes. For example, fifteen acres of land could have five individual grazing 
permittees. Arrangements would have to be made with each of the individuals before the land could be 
released back to the Navajo Nation for development . . . .”). 
113 Id. 
114 LISTOKIN, supra note 104, at 344 (internal citation omitted).   
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Litzen’s story is not unique. To get a business site or homesite lease 
requires first getting approval from grazing or chapter officials. Those 
officials, fearful of trampling on the rights of permittees, typically require 
all grazing rights permittees in the area (including those with nearby rights 
whose land is not directly impacted) to sign off on any development 
proposal. This arrangement results in pervasive hold-out problems. Rights 
holders with petty disagreements or grievances can block even the most 
community-centered forms of development, locking up land even where the 
grazing utility of the land is marginal at best.  
Though the grazing permit system initially was federally imposed, today 
the Diné have essentially complete authority over grazing and thus over the 
general direction of reservation development at the community level. This 
authority is exercised through hyper-local decision-making institutions and 
structures. Local chapter officials, grazing committees, and democratic 
processes in each chapter are involved in even relatively small changes that 
might affect the range. Proposals to move from elected grazing officials 
towards enforcement of grazing regulations by paid professional staff have 
been floated by the central government, but, so far, such a transition has not 
happened. Partly as a consequence, permittees hold disproportionate 
political power. Grazing rights holders are actively engaged in chapter 
politics. They attend meetings, serve on committees, and vote to protect their 
interests. They are often older and more tied to the existing power dynamics 
in the community than younger Diné who may live and work off-reservation. 
They also tend to be relatively conservative, protective of their grazing 
rights, and reluctant to see their community change. Such a state of affairs 
means that even fairly routine proposals—to create a formalized car repair 
business or small restaurant—involve the whole community. Entrepreneurs 
cannot rely upon background rules or zoning regulations to provide them 
with a presumptive right to develop a parcel of land; instead, grazing 
permittees typically exercise their power such that the default is to block 
development. In rural chapters, the status quo of strong grazing rights reigns 
supreme, choking off other forms of development. 
III. REINSERTING A USE REQUIREMENT FOR GRAZING RIGHTS 
What should be done to check the extent to which grazing rights 
permittees can block other forms of land use? This Essay does not give a full 
answer to that question. One of the biggest sticking points in Diné politics 
today is whether local decision-making should drive policy or whether the 
central government in Window Rock should be in charge. Traditionally, the 
different levels of government have had different spheres of primary 
responsibility. For example, extractive industry fell under the purview of 
Window Rock while local institutions handled grazing. But tribal members 
often discover that the lines between local and national authority can blur, 
and spheres often overlap in frustrating ways. When tribal members seek 
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permission to use land for a business venture or even when they try to secure 
a homesite lease, for example,115 it is all but inevitable that they will confront 
multiple hurdles. Chapter politics and the Window Rock bureaucracy can 
hamper even determined efforts by individuals to obtain formal land rights. 
Part of freeing up portions of the range for development is resolving the 
conflict between the decentralization and centralization impulses that 
complicate Navajo Nation governance.  
This Essay avoids giving an answer to whether land use should be 
governed primarily by chapters or primarily by the central government. 
Good arguments can be made on both sides of the Navajo-federalism debate. 
Chapters that are closer to the people in theory provide a more meaningful 
form of direct democracy and can offer a land use approach better tailored 
to the needs of their particular community. On the other hand, 
decentralization efforts in the past, especially the Local Governance Act of 
1998,116 did not live up to their promise,117 in part because rural chapters 
often have a thin talent pool from which to take on the often complex 
management issues that come with real power. Outside consultants can fill 
some of the planning and accounting gaps but are a prohibitively expensive 
option for long-term governance. Economies of scale—how many local land 
departments can the Navajo Nation realistically support—also favor 
centralization. But governance reform is perhaps a precondition for grazing 
and land use reform. At some point, the Diné will decide that the costs of the 
current bifurcated approach—in which tribal members encounter high 
barriers at both the chapter level and in Window Rock—are too great and 
something must change.118 But, mindful that “a smothering kind of 
paternalism” by friends of the tribe can harm the Diné as much as direct 
attacks on tribal sovereignty,119 this Essay is deliberately agnostic as to 
whether the decentralization or centralization forces should prevail.  
Where this Essay does stake a claim is on the principles that should 
guide land reform. By returning to the traditional Diné use requirement as 
central to the recognition and protection of land rights, the Navajo Nation 
(whether at the chapter level or in Window Rock) can right-size grazing 
                                                                                                                     
115 For discussion of the Navajo Nation’s 2016 effort to reform the homesite lease approval process, 
see Ezra Rosser, Right-Sizing Use Rights: Navajo Land, Bureaucracy, and Home, in CREATING PRIVATE 
SECTOR ECONOMIES IN NATIVE AMERICA: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
(Robert J. Miller et al. eds., forthcoming 2019).  
116 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 26 (1998). 
117 See ANDREW CURLEY ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND REFORM: CONSIDERING 20 YEARS OF 
THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE ACT 18–21 (2016), http://hooghan.dinecollege.edu/institutes/DPI/Docs/2016-
09%20LGA2FinalPDF.pdf (discussing structural flaws in the Local Governance Act). 
118 For a recent study exploring governance reform at the chapter level, see MICHAEL PARRISH, 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND REFORM: LOCAL EMPOWERMENT 23–28 (Jen Byers ed., 2018), 
http://www.dinecollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Local-Governance-and-Reform-Local-
Empowerment.pdf (listing recommendations for governance reform as a result of the study). 
119 Stephen Conn, Mid-Passage—The Navajo Tribe and its First Legal Revolution, 6 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 329, 344 (1978). 
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rights.120 The grazing permit system, though initially imposed on top of 
existing land holdings, arguably transformed Diné understandings of 
property rights in land. While use continues to be the basis for assertions of 
a right over land, the inverse—that land rights can be lost through disuse—
has been lost. Families continue to base their interest in land on past 
(customary) use, but the traditional understanding that land rights depend on 
use—that rights can be lost through non-use after initial acquisition—is 
under pressure. Families whose right to a particular area of land is based on 
having used the land in the past often assert an interest in land that they have 
not used in years. Complicating matters further, the same area can quickly 
become subject to the claims of neighboring families who start using the 
same land for grazing or other purposes after observing that the prior family 
appeared, through non-use, to have abandoned their interest in the land. The 
grazing permit system introduced into even the most remote parts of Diné 
society a more fixed understanding of property rights in land, rights that 
depended primarily on formal recognition in the form of a permit and only 
secondarily upon use. Lessening the hold grazing permittees have over land, 
including the problems of overlapping claims and of general resistance to 
non-agricultural development, will not be easy. But returning to the 
traditional understanding that use is not only a precondition for acquiring 
land rights but also for maintaining an interest in the land would help free 
up land for development.  
As a descriptive matter, the authority that grazing permittees exercise 
over chapter-level land use decision-making is typically wielded by an older 
generation that seeks to maintain the vast majority of tribal land, even land 
in prime locations, such as grazing land. Such protection of the status quo 
harms would-be entrepreneurs, typically younger members of the tribe, as 
well as Diné who move to a different part of the reservation and seek land 
for a homesite. But ironically, strong assertions of the need to protect grazing 
rights and the traditional sheep-centric way of life arguably reflect more the 
Anglo-American emphasis on ownership than the traditional Diné use-
dependent approach to property rights.  
Anglo-American law is certainly concerned with use, but the focus is 
the exclusionary rights of owners and not the possibility that there could be 
a dynamic relationship between use and rights.121 Put differently, the grazing 
                                                                                                                     
120 See Shoemaker, Transforming Property, supra note 10, at 63 (“To the extent a reservation 
community may choose to pursue the goal of revitalizing at least some traditional values around land and 
land tenure, many tribal governments are also focusing on nurturing those Indigenous traditions that have 
persisted.”).  
121 For more than a decade, academics have been debating just how important exclusion is to 
property law. Such debates show little sign of abating, and it is not worth rehashing the merits of each 
side here. See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 107, 115–26 (2013) (providing an overview of progressive property); Katrina M. Wyman, 
The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 192–203 (2017) (providing an overview 
of the new essentialism definition of property). But it can safely be said that exclusion is central to Anglo-
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permit system pushed reservation land use governance towards non-Indian 
notions of relatively fixed ownership interests.122 Anglo-American property 
law is not indifferent to non-use, but it is fair to say that property doctrine 
struggles with non-use and abandonment, erring on the side of strong 
ownership interests.123 The common law goes so far as to prohibit the 
abandonment of real property.124 Of course, there are exceptions—such as 
ways in which rights are undermined through non-use—but the exceptions 
found in Anglo-American property law provide imperfect solutions for the 
challenges presented by Navajo grazing rights.  
The most direct way in which Anglo-American property law deals with 
non-use is through the doctrine of adverse possession. Adverse possession 
works to transfer title from an owner who has slept on their rights, through 
non-use and failure to guard against intruders, to an adverse possessor who 
has earned a right to the property by adversely possessing the property 
continuously for a statutory period.125 The doctrine thus prioritizes use over 
non-use and, through the statutory period, establishes when non-use 
(coupled with non-enforcement of the owner’s right to exclude) can result 
in loss of property. But many people, including judges, dislike the idea that 
title should be given to an adverse possessor. The whole thing feels too much 
like theft, especially when the adverse possessor knew from the start that the 
                                                                                                                     
American concepts of property, see Merrill, supra note 107, at 740–52, even though not all scholars 
would agree that it is the core of property, see, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063–66 (2009) (proposing a social-obligation theory of property and 
arguing that “the core [of property ownership] is more complex than exclusion alone”). 
122 Tellingly, though property can be held in a variety of forms, fee simple absolute enjoys pride of 
place in how Americans understand property. Though many Americans will be tenants for extended 
periods of their lives, words such as “ownership,” “property rights,” and “land rights” generally bring to 
mind the fee simple form of ownership rather than more complicated ownership forms in which title is 
split between different parties or varies across time. For more on the place of fee simple absolute in 
American property law, see Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1466–68 
(2016); Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6–12 (2017).  
123 Arguably, the branch of property theory that emphasizes productive labor theory could provide 
a foundation for meaningful explorations of the non-use/rights dynamic that is the focus of this Essay. 
There is a large amount of literature on productive labor theory, which emphasizes productive use of 
land, an obligation not to waste resources, and a requirement that others in the community have equal 
opportunity access to community resources, but contemporary property scholars treat it somewhat 
dismissively as a part of the now disfavored natural rights approach to property law. See Eric R. Claeys, 
Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 413, 439–42 (2017) (highlighting 
the features of productive labor theory). Productive labor theory fits uncomfortably alongside a 
discussion of Navajo land reform given how John Locke’s writings were used to justify dispossessing 
Indians who were seen as not making adequate use of the land. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, If Your 
House Is Built on Land Expropriated from its Indigenous Inhabitants—You Didn’t Build That, SLATE 
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://slate.com/business/2012/09/lockean-property-rights-and-native-americans.html 
(elaborating on the inconsistency between Lockean property theory and Native American dispossession). 
124 For in-depth treatment of the law of abandonment, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to 
Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 390–404 (2010).   
125 Adverse Possession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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land was not his or her property.126 Courts, consequently, are reticent to 
follow the doctrine; rather than sign off on adverse possession-based 
transfers, they often find excuses to protect the original property owner.127 
Adverse possession arguably has limited import on the Navajo 
reservation because the doctrine is about more than just non-use. It also 
requires entry and use by an adverse possessor. In the Navajo context, the 
adverse possession doctrine could facilitate productive transfers of land 
between people with grazing rights, from an inactive to an active user of the 
range, for example. But the majority of Diné cases are marked by only one 
side (non-use) of the two-sided adverse possession relationship (non-use by 
the original rights holder coupled with use by an intruder). Consequently, 
the traditional adverse possession doctrine does little to clear the Navajo 
range of underlying grazing rights claims. A modified version of adverse 
possession that required only non-use might work; the Navajo Nation could 
justify such a modification by the fact that the tribe holds ultimate title (in 
trust with the federal government) to the land. One could argue, for example, 
that land not withdrawn from the range “belongs” in some way to all tribal 
members. There is a collective interest in freeing up rangeland for 
development, or at least in checking the veto power enjoyed by grazing 
rights holders, and a modified version of adverse possession might serve this 
interest. On the other hand, part of the beauty of the adverse possession 
doctrine is that it places the burden of proof on the adverse possessor. If the 
doctrine changed so that non-use alone was enough, then the tribe itself 
would bear the burden to establish that the grazing permittee had failed to 
use his or her portion of the range for the statutory period. Such a 
modification would change adverse possession from an Anglo-American 
doctrine that forces transfers between private parties into a tool of the Navajo 
Nation to strip tribal members with grazing rights of those previously 
recognized rights.  
If the goal is to claw back dated, unused grazing rights, Anglo-American 
law offers a more direct mechanism—tax liens—that could theoretically 
accomplish much the same. Off-reservation, when a property owner fails in 
his or her obligations (the main one being the payment of property taxes) to 
the state, the solution is not some version of adverse possession by the state, 
but instead a lien on the property.128 Property taxes encourage—and, in 
                                                                                                                     
126 Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1037, 1053 (2006) (“[C]ourts and commentators often regard the bad faith claimant as a 
thief.”).  
127 For the seminal article on how courts deal with “bad faith” adverse possessors, see Richard 
Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331 (1983).  
128 See Lien, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “lien” as a “legal right or interest 
that a creditor has in another’s property, lasting . . . until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied” and 
defining “tax lien” as a “lien on property, and all rights to property,” imposed by the federal, state, or 
local government for nonpayment of taxes). 
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practical terms, may require—productive use of property. Enforcement 
through a tax lien allows the state to reclaim property when owners fail to 
pay their property taxes.129 Another way to think about this ability of the 
state to recapture land through tax liens is as a collective claim of non-use 
that disciplines owners and, like adverse possession, punishes those who do 
not live up to the basic requirements of ownership. Superficially, with the 
exception of isolated fee simple properties located within the larger 
reservation, tax liens would seem to have little relevance in the Navajo 
Nation. After all, the Navajo Nation and the U.S. government hold most of 
the reservation land in joint trust. Tribal members typically have only use 
rights to the land. But the Navajo Nation can certainly impose a system of 
user fees that make grazing rights conditional on payment. In the event of 
nonpayment, the tribe could reclaim rangeland, checking the power 
permittees have to block all forms of development.  
In theory, fees enforced through tax liens offer the Navajo Nation an 
effective way to free up the range, but the politics of imposing fees would 
likely derail any proposal as it advanced beyond the planning stage. Given 
the poverty of the reservation, fees would have to be set at amounts that are 
low relative to off-reservation standards. But even a relatively low fee could 
convince tribal members to disclaim those portions of their customary use 
areas that they do not actually use. After all, few people will want to pay for 
something if they see no benefit in the payment, no matter how small the per 
acre fee. Of course, if the tribe were more aggressive, if it set user fees closer 
to the costs of herding, including environmental damage and governance 
costs, then more land could be freed from grazing rights claims. However, 
and this is the challenge, the imposition of any fee is likely to be politically 
dead on arrival if raised in the Navajo Nation Council. The weight of 
memory from livestock reduction is just too great. Even if they were set 
artificially low, user fees would be an extra burden on those Diné families 
already living close to subsistence levels. Just as the seemingly neutral 
culling requirements of the New Deal disproportionately harmed the most 
vulnerable, so too would Diné families experience user fees differently 
depending on their relative wealth. Families with outside income tied to 
formal sector employment likely would be less impacted than families more 
dependent on grazing. Taking a broader view, tax liens were one of the 
mechanisms through which Indians were dispossessed of their land 
following allotment. Enforcing grazing fees would be quite different from 
tax liens imposed by non-Indian governments in that the land would stay 
within the tribe; nevertheless, this history of Indian land loss likely would 
                                                                                                                     
129 Of course, sometimes the state does not want to take on the obligations of ownership or does not 
want to lose part of its tax base, as it does when land moves from private hands to state hands. See Pocono 
Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233, 235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (describing how the 
landowners attempted to sell, gift, or abandon property to a city civic association to avoid paying 
delinquent property taxes, but the city declined to accept the property each time). 
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limit the ability of the Navajo Nation to institute a meaningful grazing fee 
system.  
Fortunately, the Diné need not adopt an approach based on Anglo-
American law; instead they can revitalize their traditional practice of treating 
land rights as use-dependent. For while modified versions of adverse 
possession and tax foreclosure could help the Navajo Nation diminish the 
power grazing permittees currently enjoy, the Diné tradition of insisting on 
use arguably provides a better solution in terms of both political feasibility 
and cultural match. Reservation land, though largely free from off-
reservation fee simple ownership claims, is subject to strong ownership 
claims tied to past use. In Dreaming of Sheep in Navajo Country, a 
comprehensive and beautifully written exploration of Navajo grazing 
practices and history, Marsha Weisiger notes:  
Matrilocal residence meant that most pastures and springs 
became associated with particular matrilineages. Certainly 
Diné did not conceive of land—unlike stock—as something 
people “owned”; it was communally held, and unused land 
was available to whoever preempted it. But practically 
speaking, families tended to graze their livestock in the same 
general areas year after year, so that over time, they acquired 
generally recognized, though often overlapping, use-rights to 
particular areas.130 
The challenge is squaring the sense of ownership—which enjoys 
community support—with the idea that “unused land” is generally available 
to others who can use it. What should give when these generally recognized 
rights to particular areas conflict with Diné traditional land use practices? 
Traditionally, as the Diné Policy Institute’s 2017 report, Land Reform in the 
Navajo Nation, highlights, “There was rarely a permanence to any one 
family’s control of land. If a family moved on, another family could move 
in and occupy the land.”131 There is no simple answer to this conflict 
between tradition and generally recognized use-rights. Land rights have 
ossified, and there is little incentive for Diné families to make land 
concessions from their customary use and traditional grazing area for the 
greater good of the tribe. At some point, a choice has to be made and the 
tribe has to put its thumb on the scale. Though the tribe could improve how 
                                                                                                                     
130 WEISIGER, supra note 15, at 94 (footnote omitted).  
131 DINÉ POLICY INST., LAND REFORM IN THE NAVAJO NATION: POSSIBILITIES OF RENEWAL FOR 
OUR PEOPLE 8 (2017), 
http://hooghan.dinecollege.edu/institutes/docs/Land%20Reform%20In%20Navajo%20Nation.pdf. See 
also KELLEY & WHITELEY, supra note 48, at 84 (“Navajo individual tenure differed from the American 
capitalist form of private ownership in two ways, both holdovers from communal tenure. Anyone could 
take land from someone who claimed it but did not use it, and land in general could not be bought or 
sold.” (citation omitted)). 
 
 980 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:4 
the range is governed and how development proposals are dealt with through 
selective incorporation of aspects of Anglo-American property law, 
ultimately, a better option would be to revitalize the traditional Diné 
emphasis on use. 
Making land rights use-dependent once more will not be easy. Some 
tribal members will experience a loss if told that land they considered 
“theirs” is no longer theirs to control because the land has been unused for a 
long time.132 To revitalize the traditional use-dependent understanding of 
rights over land, the tribe might need to make compensating payments or 
allowances to tribal members who suffer a loss when the range is freed from 
dated grazing permit-based claims. But as tempting as it is to focus only on 
the loss that grazing permittees may experience, it is worth keeping in mind 
the hidden losses the current system is imposing on the tribe as a whole.  
CONCLUSION 
Given the trauma of livestock reduction, it is no wonder that both the 
Navajo Nation and the federal government are reticent about trying to tackle, 
once again, the problem of overgrazing. The original problem that motivated 
the livestock reduction program during the New Deal has not gone away—
creeping desertification continues to be a problem—but revisiting grazing 
(or even making headway on related issues, such as the need to cull the wild 
horses that roam across the reservation and destroy vegetation) has been a 
political non-starter.133 There are significant costs associated with the 
ongoing neglect of land reform as it relates to the Navajo range. The current 
system is not working. Not only does overgrazing continue, but grazing 
enforcement problems abound, non-agricultural development opportunities 
are being lost because of grazing permittees’ veto power, and very little land 
is available without a fight.134 Ultimately, the Diné will decide what Navajo 
land governance looks like.135 That the Navajo Nation now has the power to 
                                                                                                                     
132 See Katz, supra note 107, at 289–90 (arguing that property rights can best be thought of in terms 
of owners’ exclusive agenda-setting authority).   
133 The problem of wild horses, not owned by tribal members, is not new nor is it unique to the 
Navajo reservation. The Meriam Report highlighted the problem in 1928: “Worthless Horses. Many 
reservations are now overrun with worthless horses. These consume much grass that could be utilized by 
cattle and sheep. Yet the Indians love horses and are often reluctant to get rid of them.” MERIAM, supra 
note 53, at 507. 
134 See Robert J. Miller, Sovereign Resilience: Reviving Private Sector Economic Institutions in 
Indian Country, 2018 BYU L. REV. 1331, 1374 (2019) (“Indian country seems to have a surplus of one 
infrastructure need: available land. Yet even here, Indian entrepreneurs often encounter serious problems 
in acquiring the infrastructure of sites to lease to operate businesses. Many reservations have lots of 
seemingly empty space, but preexisting grazing rights, for example, and other issues actually limit where 
businesses and storefront establishments can be established or built.”).  
135 For more on what land reform requires of tribes, see Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s 
Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 549 (2017) 
(“The process of making Indian property law more adaptive—more in the spirit of tribal sovereignty, in 
line with self-determination goals, and consistent with an indigenous land ethic—must itself be 
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set the agenda itself is itself a significant victory considering the history of 
heavy-handed federal involvement in even relatively local land use 
decisions. Bringing back the tribe’s traditional use-dependent understanding 
of the land rights tribal members enjoy would help the Navajo Nation regain 
control over the range and would create space for the Diné to take more 
advantage of growth opportunities that respond to the needs of all tribal 
members.  
 
                                                                                                                     
implemented in an iterative (and adaptive) way. This requires participatory local processes to define the 
problem, set tribal community objectives, assess the land tenure baseline, and formulate models of reform 
that are iteratively tested as they are deployed.”).  
